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Abstract. This paper analyzes the relationship between market concentration in the private 
segment of the water industry and water prices with a sample of municipalities located in 
the Southern Spanish region of Andalusia. In doing so, several Heckman sample selection 
models are estimated with the main finding being that market concentration increases the 
price of water for residential use charged by private companies. The main policy recom-
mendation is that urban water service privatization must be accompanied by the appropriate 
regulatory and institutional frameworks to promote competition among businesses and 
monitor water pricing. 
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1. Introduction 
Many governments have implemented measures of economic liberalization since the late 
1970s. Inspired by the Public Choice Theory, decisions were taken to reduce the presence 
of the public sector in the economy in favor of private enterprises. Following these regula-
tory changes, many local governments opted to outsource and in some cases, privatize 
some municipal services (Bel and Fageda, 2009). 
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Among the services that are a competence of local governments, the urban water supply has 
generated the most controversy regarding privatization; in fact, reform in many developed 
economies has not addressed the privatization of urban water services. In most OECD 
countries, less than 10% of the population and in some cases none whatsoever are supplied 
by the private water industry. Only in France, England and the Czech Republic does privat-
ization represent more than 50%. In Greece, Italy and Spain, privatization accounts for be-
tween 30% and 50%, while in Australia, Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Portugal, Slovakia 
and the United States, the figure ranges from 10% to 30% (Pérard, 2009). It is worth noting 
that privatization in Europe predominantly takes the form of concessions to private firms 
(or contractual public-private partnerships); the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, 
where privatization has been mostly carried out through the sale of assets, are however sig-
nificant exceptions. 
Governments are reluctant to privatize the urban water service due to the nature of the wa-
ter industry. One peculiarity is that this service provides access to a basic good (García-
Valiñas et al, 2010). Moreover, it is difficult to introduce competition into the water market 
and the contracting process of water services is more prone to suffering competition fail-
ures than other public services (Bel et al, 2010). A third feature is the high transaction costs 
associated to the privatization of the water service (Bel and Warner, 2008). 
One argument that has also been traditionally used to oppose the privatization of the urban 
water service is that private enterprises charge higher prices, without necessarily improving 
the quality of the service. Evidence shows that water prices are higher in private firms than 
public firms in France (Carpentier et al, 2006; Chong et al, 2006a), Germany (Ruester and 
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Zschille, 2010), and large cities in Spain (Martínez-Espiñeira et al, 2009).1 One possible 
explanation for the higher prices charged by private enterprises has to do with market struc-
ture, i.e. imperfect competition among the few companies operating at national level; fur-
thermore, public delivery is associated to higher subsidies from the public budget. 
Several reasons might explain why markets differ in their degree of competition (Belle-
flamme and Peitz, 2010). Whatever the reason, uncompetitive markets tend to result in a 
higher degree of market power for firms, which can be defined as the ability to raise prices 
above the perfectly competitive level. Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) define two ways of 
measuring market power. Firstly, through the difference between prices and marginal costs. 
However, as in the empirical case in this study, marginal costs are often not directly ob-
servable and even prices are obscure. The second way to measure the market power of 
firms is by means of indexes that reflect the level of concentration in the market. 
In this context, the objective of our research is to analyze the relationship between market 
structure in the water industry and water prices of private companies.2 To the best of our 
knowledge, only two studies have addressed this issue previously, both focusing on the 
French case. Neither of them obtains robust evidence on the relationship between competi-
tion and water prices. On the one hand, Garcia et al (2005) shows that the presence of a 
small local firm (outsider) in a competitive bidding process does not automatically increase 
                                                
1 Notwithstanding, a recent paper by García-Valiñas et al (2012) has studied the price of water for 
residential use in both small and large cities in Southern Spain, concluding that private companies 
charge lower prices than public ones. 
2 Furthermore, let us emphasize that we do not intend to analyze all complexities of every manage-
ment option for the urban water cycle, as it would go far beyond our aim and perhaps would deserve 
a full paper on its own. For varieties of management options in Spain, the environment of our case 
study, see Warner and Bel (2008) and Bel et al (2013); also, see Bakker (2010) and Furlong and 
Bakker (2010) for a wider and more global analysis. 
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competition leading to a fall in prices. On the other hand, Chong et al (2006b) finds that 
when operators control the monopoly for the entire duration of the contract, their prices are 
not mitigated by a direct competition effect. Furthermore, no relationship is found between 
the prices charged by private operators and ex post competition in water contracting. 
In the two aforementioned papers, organizational choices are considered randomly chosen. 
However, this assumption constitutes a serious limitation because organizational choices 
might be influenced by numerous characteristics of operating environments, some of which 
could also affect water prices. Chong et al (2006b) acknowledged this limitation and sug-
gested that future research overcome it by making organizational choice endogenous. This 
is the approach we take in our analysis by simultaneously estimating both a price equation 
and a privatization equation with Heckman sample selection models. In doing so, we use 
data related to the moment in time when privatization was decided, thus obtaining more 
robust results. 
Our paper performs an analysis of the relationship between market concentration and water 
pricing in the private segment of the water industry based on data from a sample of munici-
palities located in the Southern Spanish region of Andalusia. We use variables representing 
both the degree of concentration in the industry at the time the service is privatized and the 
market share of the company that manages the service once it has been awarded. Contrary 
to the results obtained in previous research, we find evidence supporting the fact that mar-
ket concentration influences the pricing of water for residential uses. The implication of this 
result for policymakers is straightforward: market concentration makes it advisable to cre-
ate (or strengthen) a regulatory and institutional framework to monitor pricing. 
The article is organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section 2 describes the regulato-
ry framework for privatizing water services in Spain and the market structure in Andalusia. 
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Section 3 explains the methodology, describes the data and establishes the main hypothesis 
to be verified. Section 4 comments on the results and their policy implications. A final Sec-
tion concludes. 
2. Privatization of urban water management in Andalusia 
2.1. Legal framework 
The legal framework that regulates the management of municipal services in Spain is made 
up of Law 7/1985 (Local Government Regulations) and Law 57/2003 (Measures for the 
Modernization of Local Government).3 Article 25 of the first of these laws stipulates that 
local governments are responsible for the urban water supply, although they are empowered 
to decide the legal form of such provision. Current legislation establishes different possibil-
ities. In the first place, the local government may choose to manage the service from the 
council itself (in-house) or to outsource it. In the second case, management may be either 
transferred to a public company or privatized through either a private firm (contractual pub-
lic-private partnership, or full privatization) or a mixed firm (institutional public-private 
partnership, or partial privatization). 
Although in Spain there has traditionally been a preference for public management, differ-
ent forms of public-private partnerships have gained significance in recent decades, includ-
ing lease contracts, mixed-owned companies, concessions and management contracts (Ol-
mos-Giupponi, 2013). Among them, concession agreements are the most widespread form 
of privatizing local water services. They are made official through a management contract 
of public services by which the local government, which usually retains the ownership of 
                                                
3 It is worth noting that by means of the Law 27/2013 of Rationalization and Sustainability of Local 
Administration, passed on December 30th 2013, the function of coordination of urban water deliv-
ery in municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants has been transferred to provincial governments. 
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the service, entrusts operations to a natural person or legal entity. Through a concession, the 
private company will manage the service at its own risk and venture during the term of the 
contract. Mixed-ownership is also acquiring increasing relevance in the management of 
water service, and can be considered as a partial privatization that allows the promotion of 
public interests to be combined with the benefits of private management (Bel and Fageda, 
2010). Ownership is shared between the public partner, who usually maintains ownership 
of 51% of the capital and is supposed to ensure the public interest, and the private partner, 
who has know-how of the industry and is often in charge of the day-to-day management 
(Bel and Warner, 2008, González-Gómez et al., 2009). 
The full or partial transfer of water service management to a private company is awarded 
for a certain period of time after a competitive bidding process. There is a limit of fifty 
years in contracts that involve the construction of infrastructure and operations, and twenty-
five years in those which only involve running the service. Candidates in the bidding pro-
cess place a first-price sealed-bid in response to a notice announcing the public tender of 
the contract of water service management. This announcement includes the technical and 
economic conditions of the contract and the procedure and assessment criteria, also detail-
ing the commitments that the contractor will have to fulfill after signing the contract. Bid-
ders must submit their technical and financial proposal in sealed envelopes and the contract 
is awarded to the company that makes the most advantageous proposal considering a num-
ber of criteria. 
2.2. Privatizing water services in Andalusia 
Andalusia is a European region located in Southern Spain with a surface area of 87,268 km2 
and a population of around 8.4 million inhabitants. Administratively, this region is made up 
of 8 provinces and 771 municipalities. In 2009, less than 24% of these municipalities had 
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fully or partially privatized the management of urban water services; in 53% of them, man-
agement had been completely transferred to a private company, while just 47% had dele-
gated management to a public-private company. While municipalities mainly opted for full 
privatization in the late 80s and the first half of the 90s, mixed firms have been preferred 
since the end of the 90s (Ruiz-Villaverde et al, 2010). Nonetheless, as also noticed by Ol-
mos-Guiupponi (2013) for the Spanish case, recent trends in Andalusia show a certain 
slowing down in privatizations.4 
One of the main features of the water market in Andalusia is the high concentration in a 
few companies, as shown in Table 1 by the scores recorded by CR1 and CR2, which meas-
ure the market share of the leading firm in the area and that of the two leading firms taken 
together, respectively. Together, the two largest firms (Aquagest and Aqualia) supply water 
to 57% of the municipalities that have fully or partially privatized management and to near-
ly 80% of the population.5 Aquagest belongs to Aguas de Barcelona (Agbar), the holding 
that comprises over 150 companies and around 13,000 employees and provides water ser-
vices not only in Spain but also in countries like the United Kingdom, Mexico, China, 
                                                
4 While some new announcements of privatization have simply been stopped because of the strong 
opposition of citizens, in others cases existing contracts have been cancelled due to breaches by 
private companies; finally, there are also cases in which once the contract has expired, the local 
government has decided to return provision of water services to public management (Ruiz-
Villaverde et al, 2010). 
5 The greater concentration in terms of population is probably due to the fact that once companies 
gain a certain level of market power they show more interest in new privatization tenders for the 
most populated cities. However, it is worth mentioning that some highly populated Andalusian mu-
nicipalities such as Seville and Córdoba maintain the public provision of water services. The local 
governments of these two important cities, traditionally from left-ring parties, have advocated the 
public management of local services as an essential principle of their ideological postulates, e.g., the 
public company that provides water services in Seville aims to apply the principles of fairness and 
equity in determining water prices (Castillo-Manzano et al, 2013). 
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Chile, Cuba, Colombia and Algeria. Aqualia is part of Fomento de Construcciones y Con-
tratas (FCC), a holding company that, in addition to providing water services to more than 
850 Spanish municipalities, is also present in 54 countries, including China, Mexico, Portu-
gal, the Czech Republic, Poland and Algeria. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)6 also indicates a high degree of concentration. Ac-
cording to the Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice (USDJ&FTC, 
2010), markets can be categorized as unconcentrated (HHI below 0.10), moderately con-
centrated (HHI between 0.10 and 0.18) and highly concentrated (HHI above 0.18). Fur-
thermore, the European Commission (EC, 2004) establishes that competition may be con-
sidered tough enough in markets with a HHI below 0.20. Taking these figures as bench-
marks, the market in the private sector of the Andalusian water industry can be considered 
as highly concentrated, as it is also the case in the rest of Spain (González-Gómez et al, 
2012). 
3. Methodology, data and hypotheses 
3.1. Methodological notes 
Assessing the effect of market concentration on the price of water charged by private com-
panies is not straightforward. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, privatiza-
tion does not occur randomly. Numerous features of operating environments are likely ei-
ther to make the management of the urban water service more attractive for private firms or 
to influence the willingness of local governments to privatize. Secondly, private prices are 
only observed if the municipality has previously privatized the urban water service. Fur-
                                                
6 This index is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and 
then summing the resulting numbers. It approaches zero when a market consists of a large number 
of firms of relatively equal size and increases both as the number of firms in the market decreases 
and as their disparity in size increases. 
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thermore, some variables may remain hidden to the researcher, while simultaneously affect-
ing both the likelihood of privatization and the price of water once the service has been 
privatized. Under these circumstances, conventional ordinary least square regression meth-
ods yield biased results due to the existence of sample selection bias (Wooldridge, 2002). In 
order to overcome this difficulty, we use Heckman selection models (Heckman, 1976, 
1979). 
The Heckman selection model estimates two equations simultaneously, namely, the out-
come equation and the selection equation. In our case, the outcome equation models the 
price established by private firms for water for residential uses as a function of a series of 
explanatory variables, namely XPrice, including those representing market concentration: 
Price PriceWater price X=β + ε         (1) 
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and εPrice ∼ N (0,σ). 
However, the dependent variable in the outcome equation, i.e., private prices for water, is 
only observed for municipalities where the urban water service has been previously privat-
ized. The privatization process is modeled assuming that there is a latent regression rela-
tionship or selection equation in which the privatization choice depends on a series of vari-
ables ZPrivatization: 
Privatization PrivatizationPrivatization Z= δ + ε        (2) 
δ being a second vector of unknown parameters and εPrivatization ∼ N (0,1). 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the error terms in the price equation and the privatization 
equations are jointly normally distributed with a correlation rho. The estimation of the 
Heckman two-equation model controls for the part of the privatization decision that is cor-
related with the error term in the price equation and requires the existence of at least one 
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variable that affects privatization, but not the price of water. If the correlation between the 
error terms in the selection and outcome equations is statistically significant, the Heckman 
selection model yields consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates for all the parame-
ters in both equations. 
3.2. Data and hypotheses 
We use information from 715 Andalusian municipalities, which represent 93% of the mu-
nicipalities in the region.7 In 2009, 553 of these municipalities provided urban water ser-
vices publicly, either in-house or by contracting out to a public firm, while management 
had been privatized in 162 municipalities, either totally (77 municipalities) or partially (85 
municipalities). The sample is representative of almost 90% of the municipalities that had 
privatized the management of water services in year 2009. 
3.2.1. The price equation 
The price of water in Andalusia is different in each municipality, except in those cases 
where the same company provides water services to several neighboring towns and chooses 
to set the same price for the entire service area. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that in 
Andalusia the regulatory and institutional framework does not provide strict guidelines on 
what the structure of the pricing system or the level of water prices for residential use 
should be. 
In all the municipalities within the sample, urban water suppliers charge non-linear and 
non-uniform prices, with tariffs divided in two parts: a fixed quota for the service connec-
tion and a variable quota that rises in accordance with blocks of consumption. The lack of 
                                                
7 Some municipalities are not included in the sample due to a lack of information for one or more of 
the variables involved in our analysis. 
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homogeneity among municipalities in water tariffs and the unavailability of information 
about the distribution of consumption make it difficult to build a variable to represent the 
price of water for residential uses. In order to overcome this difficulty, we have used the 
tariff structure in each municipality to calculate, as in Chong et al (2006a), the price of a 
representative bill corresponding to the consumption of 15 m3, which is the average con-
sumption observed in Andalusia (INE, 2011). This price includes both the fixed quota and 
the price for the water consumed and is used as the dependent variable in our price equa-
tion. Furthermore, in order to test the robustness of our estimations, the price of two more 
bills corresponding to average consumptions of 10 and 20 m3, respectively, have also been 
calculated. Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for water prices in our sample 
showing the great differences that exist across municipalities. 
In order to explain price differences we have considered the variables described in Appen-
dix 1. Some descriptive statistics can be found in Table 3. The choice of these variables is 
based on the previous literature (Garcia et al, 2005; Carpentier et al, 2006; Chong et al, 
2006a, 2006b; González-Gómez and Guardiola, 2009; Martínez-Espiñeira et al, 2009; 
Thorsten et al, 2009; Ruester and Zschille, 2010; González-Gómez et al, 2011) and is con-
ditioned by the availability of statistical information. 
As is usual in this type of analysis, we have considered a series of variables accounting for 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the environment and the technical characteristics of the 
water service. In all instances, they have an impact on service costs and, therefore, on water 
prices. Concerning socioeconomic features, we have introduced the variables POPULATION 
and DENSITY OF POPULATION, their effect on prices being ambiguous (Martínez-Espiñeira et 
al, 2009). On the one hand, the larger a municipality, the more a supplier can exploit the 
economies of scale in the industry (Bottasso and Conti, 2009); however, this at the same 
time implies greater complexity in the management of the service, which can raise costs. 
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On the other hand, higher population concentration leads to higher congestion expenses, 
while greater dispersion leads to higher pumping costs because of diseconomies of density 
(Kim and Clark, 1988). Regarding the technical characteristics of the service, we include 
the STRONG WATER TREATMENT variable, which is a dummy that identifies municipalities 
where it is necessary to carry out major water treatment in order to make it suitable for hu-
man consumption. As more complex treatment processes entail higher costs for the compa-
ny, this variable is expected to be positively related to prices.8 
In Spain, it is common for a single company to provide urban water services to several ad-
jacent municipalities. The strategy of expanding the service area allows companies to ex-
ploit the economies of scale and density in the industry and, consequently, to reduce aver-
age costs (González-Gómez and García-Rubio, 2008). In order to contrast the influence of 
this strategy on water prices, the dummy variable CONSORTIUM has been included, which is 
expected to be negatively related to water prices. 
Furthermore, the dummy variable PRIVATE MANAGEMENT seeks to test whether there are dif-
ferences between the prices charged by private companies or contractual public-private 
partnerships and mixed firms or institutional public-private partnerships. The control exert-
ed over mixed companies by the public partnership can influence prices in two ways. On 
the one hand, it can contain prices better, while on the other hand, it can force companies to 
make decisions aimed at promoting general interests that imply higher costs and, therefore, 
higher prices. The expected effect of this variable is therefore uncertain.9 Finally, five 
                                                
8 In relation to the technical characteristics of the service, we also considered including the length of 
the delivery network as an explanatory variable, which could be positively correlated to the price of 
water. However, the high correlation between this variable and POPULATION has led us to exclude it 
from the estimation. 
9 Cruz and Marques (2012) have recently argued that, in spite of the theoretical advantages of insti-
tutional public-private partnerships, the empirical evidence for the case of the Portuguese water 
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dummy variables representing the companies with the largest market share in Andalusia 
have also been included to control for differences in water pricing strategies among firms. 
3.2.1.1. Variables representing market structure 
In addition to the variables mentioned above, a set of variables aimed at measuring the 
market concentration in the Andalusian water industry has been considered. In Spain, given 
the legislation governing the privatization of water, the potential relationship between mar-
ket structure and prices can be held in two different points in time, namely, when the con-
cession is awarded and during the term of the contract when the supplier acts as a local mo-
nopoly. 
Concerning the first of these times, a requirement for the bidders in an auction is to set a 
water price to be paid by service users. In order to capture this first relationship between 
market concentration and water prices, three alternative indicators of MARKET CONCENTRA-
TION have been computed at provincial level, which is considered the relevant market re-
garding the availability of private vendors10, namely, CR1, CR2 and HHI, as defined in Sec-
tion 2.2. In all cases, market shares are computed according to the population served. These 
variables were computed taking into account the value of each indicator in the year in 
which the local government decided to privatize the urban water service and aim to capture 
the competition risk perceived by the bidders in the competitive bidding process. A greater 
degree of concentration implies fewer potential competitors. 
                                                                                                                                               
service shows that the complexity involved in their management usually leads to poor protection of 
the public interest. 
10 Spatial proximity has generally been accepted as an intensifier of price competition, although it 
has also been pointed out that in some local oligopolistic markets it might act as an inhibitor of 
price competition (Kuenne, 1989). 
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The second time when the relationship between market structure and prices might exist is, 
as noted, when the contractor acts as a local monopoly. Spanish legislation allows water 
rates to be modified, which usually occurs annually. The process begins with the prepara-
tion of a tariff review record by the supplier company, which must then be approved by the 
municipal government. Important information asymmetries exist in water services and 
transaction costs are high (Brown and Potoski, 2005), so the company may impose its dom-
inant position on the pricing proposal year in year out. The relationship between supplier 
market power and price is captured by the variable MARKET SHARE OF THE SUPPLYING FIRM, 
measured on the basis of the population supplied in the provincial market. The more market 
power a company has, the higher prices are expected to be. The reason is that the smaller 
the number of external references for local governments, the more asymmetric their infor-
mation will be and the more benefits the supplying company will reap from its dominant 
position. 
Concerning the annual review of tariffs, one might also expect water prices to increase as 
years go by. Indeed, the course of time since privatization can increase the market power of 
settled firms, thus eroding competition (Bel and Costas 2006; Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2008), 
which might have made it easier to increase effective prices through the various tariff re-
views. Thus, the variable YEARS SINCE PRIVATIZATION, which measures the number of years 
elapsed from the year of privatization to 2009, is expected to be positively related to the 
price of water.11 However, one might expect this effect, while positive, to decrease over 
time, such that with the passing of time firms will tend to contain the rise in water prices. 
The reason is that contracts are limited in time, so the company will have to adjust its pric-
                                                
11 There is a possibility that the municipalities that privatized earlier have the most limited opportu-
nities for cost-containment. In this regard, it is worth noting that we do not consider the year in 
which the service was first privatized, but the year in which the last (that might not be the first) con-
tract was awarded. 
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ing strategy to take into account that the local government may reconsider its decision to 
privatize in the future. Therefore, as the end of the contract approaches, companies would 
adopt a pricing strategy that increases their options to renew the contract. Consequently, the 
coefficient of the variable YEARS SINCE PRIVATIZATION-SQUARED is expected to be negative 
and significant. 
3.2.2. The privatization equation 
In the equation of privatization, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes 
a value of zero if in 2009 the urban water service is provided publicly, either in-house or 
through a public firm, and one if the service has been either totally or partially privatized. 
The explanatory variables are those usually employed in this type of study, including POPU-
LATION, FINANCIAL BURDEN, INCOME PER CAPITA, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, NEIGHBORING EFFECT, 
CONSORTIUM, WATER CAPTURE SYSTEM, IDEOLOGY and MEDITERRANEAN RIVER BASIN. The defi-
nitions and sources of these variables are provided in Appendix 1. In addition, following 
the recommendation by Bel and Fageda (2007), the explanatory variables are measured at 
the time the decision to privatize the water service was taken, rather than at a later date, as 
is the case in most previous studies. As noted by Picazo-Tadeo et al (2012), by considering 
the time dimension of the variables we expect to enhance the explanatory power of our 
model. 
4. Results and policy implications 
The results of the estimation by maximum likelihood of our sample selection model in 
equations (1) and (2) are in Table 4. In order to test the robustness of the effect of market 
concentration on water prices, four different models have been estimated. In all models, 
socioeconomic and technical variables, as well as firm dummies, are included in the price 
equation as explanatory factors. In addition, models 1 to 3 include variables representing 
16 
market concentration at the time when the decision to award the contract for the provision 
of the water service is taken (CR1, CR2 and HHI, respectively), while model 4 includes the 
relevant variable once the contract has been awarded, namely, MARKET SHARE OF THE SUP-
PLYING FIRM. Furthermore, all models include the variable YEARS SINCE PRIVATIZATION and its 
square. 
In all models, the value estimated for the parameter rho is statistically different from zero 
and stands at around 0.75 (p-values for the likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of 
independent equations are always below 0.001). This result indicates that the error terms in 
the price and privatization equations are positively correlated and justifies the use of a se-
lection model to obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates for the parameters 
of interest in the price and privatization equations. 
Concerning these parameters let us start by briefly commenting on the results for the privat-
ization equation. In line with previous research, the likelihood of privatization increases 
with the size of the municipality (variable POPULATION), indicating that in more complex 
environments local governments tend to delegate the management of water services search-
ing for the know-how of private firms. Similarly, private companies may prefer to manage 
services in more populated cities, where investment per inhabitant is lower and expected 
profits are higher (Martínez-Espiñeira et al, 2009).12 However, the negative and statistically 
significant sign of the variable POPULATION-SQUARED indicates that this effect is decreasing. 
The probability of privatization also increases with INCOME PER CAPITA, the relationship 
being statistically significant; this confirms the hypothesis that private firms have more 
incentives to provide the water service in municipalities with higher income per inhabitant 
because profits are expected to be higher. The variable PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT is negatively 
                                                
12 Furlong and Bakker (2010) indicate, nonetheless, that direct delivery may not be optimal in small 
municipalities, as it results in excessively higher prices and poor quality services. 
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and significantly related to the likelihood of privatization, supporting the hypothesis of the 
pressure against privatization exerted by local lobbies of public employees on local gov-
ernments. 
A positive and statistically significant relationship is found between the variable NEIGHBOR-
ING EFFECT and the privatization of water services. This finding is also in line with previous 
literature (Miralles, 2008) and could be explained by two main reasons (González-Gómez 
et al, 2011). On the one hand, firms already established in an area might wish to expand 
their business to take full advantage of economies of scale by offering attractive deals to 
neighboring municipalities; on the other hand, the experience of other municipalities in the 
vicinity can reduce the uncertainty in decision-making processes thus facilitating privatiza-
tion. CONSORTIUM has a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of privati-
zation, supporting the idea of the interest of private water utilities in managing water ser-
vices in larger areas in order to exploit economies of scale. 
Finally, relationships without statistical significance are found for the variables FINANCIAL 
BURDEN, WATER CAPTURE SYSTEM, IDEOLOGY and MEDITERRANEAN RIVER BASIN. Concerning 
FINANCIAL BURDEN, our result is consistent with empirical findings on the privatization of 
public services in Europe (Bel and Fageda, 2007, 2009). In our view, the existence of un-
balanced fiscal situations might push local governments to outsource municipal services in 
a search for extraordinary sources of income. However, private firms might also be reluc-
tant to take over the provision of water services in municipalities with high fiscal deficits 
because water infrastructures are expected to be in poorer condition. The fact that variable 
IDEOLOGY is not significant might reflect a pragmatic approach on behalf of the largest par-
ties to the choices on public service management. Indeed, this is a very frequent result in 
the empirical literature on public service privatization (Bel and Fageda, 2007, 2009). Last-
ly, lack of statistical significance of the geographical variable representing the river basin 
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municipalities belong to is also in line with previous literature (González-Gómez et al, 
2011). 
4.1. Results for the determinants of water prices 
Regarding the results obtained for the parameters in the price equation, the variable POPU-
LATION is found to exert a significant and positive effect on water prices in all models. On 
the contrary, the sign estimated for the variable DENSITY OF POPULATION is negative and sta-
tistically significant, suggesting the existence of economies of density in the provision of 
water services, which could result in lower prices. The estimated parameter for the variable 
STRONG WATER TREATMENT is statistically significant and has the expected sign. More inten-
sive treatment to ensure the quality and drinkability of water for residential use entails 
higher costs and therefore higher prices. There is also a close relationship between the 
treatment used for making water suitable for human consumption and its source. Generally, 
surface water is poorer quality than water from underground, since it is more exposed to 
external pollutants and, therefore, needs more intensive treatment in order to make it suita-
ble for human consumption. 
The result obtained for the variable CONSORTIUM suggests that the association of municipali-
ties is a good strategy to reduce costs, such that prices are significantly lower when a single 
manager provides the service to several surrounding municipalities.13 Moreover, the signif-
icant and negative relationship between PRIVATE MANAGEMENT and water prices indicates 
that prices are higher when the service is managed by an institutional public-private part-
                                                
13 Alternatively, one could believe that having a consortium would lead a firm to enjoy greater mar-
ket power, thus raising water prices. In practice, this implies that the variable CONSORTIUM would be 
positively correlated with the market share of the supplying firm; however, we have re-estimated 
our model 4 excluding the variable CONSORTIUM in the price equation and the sign and statistical 
significance of the coefficient for the variable MARKET SHARE OF THE SUPPLYING FIRM is maintained. 
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nership (mixed firm). The more direct control that the local government exerts on managing 
the service in an institutional public-private partnership probably leads to more ambitious 
conditions regarding the extent and quality of water services, which will tend to result in 
higher costs and ultimately higher prices to be paid by the user. 
Finally, results for firm dummies show the existence of different business strategies in the 
policy of water pricing in Andalusia.14 The sign and statistical significance obtained for the 
parameter of the variable DUMMY FOR FIRM4 suggests that this firm sets higher prices for 
water. Although the result is less robust, it also appears that the firm represented by DUMMY 
FOR FIRM2 sets higher water prices. 
Turning to the results obtained for the variables representing market concentration, our re-
sults indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship between the degree of mar-
ket concentration and water prices. Moreover, this result is robust and appears in all our 
models. In models 1 to 3, the estimated coefficients for variables CR1, CR2 and HHI are all 
positive and statistically significant. This relationship may be due to the strategy followed 
by water firms at the time to bid for the tender to privatize the service. In areas with higher 
market concentration, bidding companies foresee the competition of a smaller number of 
competitors in public tenders and, consequently, propose a higher price for water. Similar-
ly, the parameter of the variable MARKET SHARE OF THE SUPPLYING FIRM is positively and 
significantly related to the price of water, suggesting that the bargaining power of water 
firms in the annual process of reviewing prices is greater when its market share is higher. 
With incomplete contracts and asymmetric information, greater market power facilitates the 
exploitation of positioning advantages in the sector. 
                                                
14 In compliance with confidentiality commitments, in Table 4 the dummies for the five leading 
firms have been randomly renamed as DUMMY FOR FIRM1 to DUMMY FOR FIRM5. 
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The result for the variables representing the time elapsed since the management of the ser-
vice was privatized for the first time is also that expected. On the one hand, a positive rela-
tionship between the price of water and the variable YEARS SINCE PRIVATIZATION is obtained, 
showing that firms tend to raise their prices once they have been awarded the service. On 
the other hand, the negative sign of the variable YEARS SINCE PRIVATIZATION-SQUARED sug-
gests that, as years go by, the increase in prices is smaller. Probably, given that contracts for 
the supply of water services have a limited duration, proximity to the time of completion 
encourages companies to moderate their rises in water prices and therefore safeguard their 
interests. First, because the local government can decide to re-municipalize the water ser-
vice at the end of the contract and, secondly, because even if there is a new public tender to 
choose a private manager for the service, local governments could encourage proposals 
from new bidders. 
In summary, the results of our research show that the degree of market concentration influ-
ences the price for water set by private firms in Andalusia. Existing market concentration in 
certain areas of Andalusia, in the context of a clearly oligopolistic industry, is reflected in 
higher prices for residential water. Furthermore, our findings regarding the positive rela-
tionship between market concentration and water prices within a framework of competition 
for the market are consistent with the existing literature on market concentration and prices 
within frameworks of competition in the market. As found in these last environments, the 
effect of concentration on prices in the water sector could be explained by the higher prob-
ability of collusion, given that market concentration makes it easier coordinating collusive 
prices, and detecting that another company is breaking the collusive agreement. Also, a 
dominant firm may follow a price-leadership strategy leading to higher prices. 
Additionally, in order to test the robustness of our results against different definitions of the 
price variable, we have re-estimated all our models in two alternative scenarios in which 
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prices are represented by a bill corresponding to consumption of 10 and 20 m3, respective-
ly. The results are presented in Appendix 2. For the sake of simplicity, only the parameters 
estimated for the variables representing market concentration are reported. These parame-
ters confirm that the relationship between water prices and market concentration is robust to 
the definition of the price variable.15 
Finally, it is also worth highlighting that a highly suitable variable for measuring competi-
tion when franchising the water service could have been the number of firms participating 
in the competitive bidding processes. In this sense, the Auction Theory predicts that the 
more bidders when franchising the water service, the lower water prices should be, as a 
result of greater competition. Unfortunately, our sources of data have not allowed us to ob-
tain this variable for all the auctions in which urban water services in Andalusian munici-
palities were privatized.16 
                                                
15 The statistical significance of the parameters for the remaining variables in the price equation and 
variables in the privatization equation makes no difference with respect to those reported in Table 4. 
16 The information about the number of bidders is managed by local governments at the time of 
resolving competitive bidding processes and is then incorporated into an administrative dossier and 
filed. In the course of elaborating our database, we submitted requests for this information to all the 
councils of Andalusian municipalities that had privatized urban water services, but after insisting on 
several occasions, we only received a positive response from slightly more than 40 municipalities. 
In addition, many of these cases corresponded to joint privatizations of water services in a consorti-
um of municipalities, so the number of bidders was the same for all municipalities included in the 
consortium. These features considerably reduced the variability of the number of bidders, such that 
introducing it in our estimations makes it difficult to obtain statistically significant results. In any 
case, when we re-estimate our model using the number of bidders as an explanatory variable repre-
senting competition in the price equation, the parameter associated to this variable is not statistically 
significant and the performance of the model is perceptibly poorer when compared to the models in 
Table 4. The results of these estimations are available upon demand. 
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The main policy implication of our results is that market concentration increases water 
prices. This would be the consequence of regulatory failures, such as the absence of effec-
tive regulation of the pricing processes for water in the region studied. The only control 
over the awarding of tenders and tariff review processes is exerted by local governments, 
but it might not be enough to compensate for competition failures in the industry. Further-
more, local government control is usually exerted by unskilled bureaucrats, who are at a 
disadvantage in relation to private service managers (Martínez-Espiñeira et al, 2009). 
Moreover, there is no independent body in Andalusia, such as those which are common in 
English-speaking countries, for instance Ofwat in the United Kingdom or the provincial 
regulatory authorities in Australia, which control the process of water pricing and/or per-
form comparative analyses of the activity of water utilities in order to highlight situations of 
inefficiency or abuse of dominant positions in the market. 
The most similar organisms in Andalusia to those mentioned above are the Andalusian Wa-
ter Council and the Andalusian Water Observatory, both dependent from the regional gov-
ernment and, in our opinion, with very limited capacity to control the process of water pric-
ing and monitoring the activity of the water industry in the region. The Andalusian Water 
Council was created in 1995 and plays the role of advisory body for regional policymakers. 
The Andalusian Water Observatory was approved in 2012 (Law 52/2012) also as an advi-
sory organism, and is mainly intended to perform studies related to issues such as the urban 
demand for water, the costs of the management of the service and the structure of water 
tariffs. However, lack of independence introduces reasonable doubts about its actual capaci-
ty to monitor the activity of the Andalusian water industry. Lastly, and most importantly, 
despite having been approved in 2012, the Andalusian Water Observatory is not still opera-
tive due to not being endowed with budgetary resources. 
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5. Summary and conclusions 
In recent decades, some governments in developed countries have privatized the manage-
ment of urban water services; however, the debate is still open and social reluctance to pri-
vatization is increasing (Hall and Lobina, 2012). In Italy a nationwide referendum held on 
12-13 June 2011 rejected national legislation that intended to make water service privatiza-
tion and liberalization compulsory. Furthermore, urban water delivery has been recently re-
municipalized in important European cities such as Paris in 2010 and Berlin in 2013, and 
re-municipalization is also a widespread phenomenon in Hungary. Public dissatisfaction 
with water prices and lack of competition under private delivery are among the main driv-
ers of pressures for re-municipalization. 
In this framework, this research studies the relationship between the market structure in the 
private sector of the water industry and the price of water for residential uses. Our main 
contribution is to analyze whether market concentration affects water prices charged by 
private companies. In order to do so, information belonging to a sample of municipalities 
located in the Southern Spanish region of Andalusia is used. Empirical evidence is obtained 
of the relationship between market concentration and water prices. In the first place, it is 
found that higher market concentration at the time the service is awarded leads to higher 
water prices. Secondly, once the contract for the provision of the service is awarded, firms 
with a larger market share make their dominant position effective by setting higher prices 
for water. Thus, market concentration is associated with higher prices. The absence of spe-
cific regulation from an independent organism that supervises the process of tariff reviews 
further aggravates the situation. Therefore, it seems that potential competition failures in 
the water industry have not been well resolved by Andalusian legislators. 
Finally, our results enable some recommendations to be made for economic policy. Firstly, 
privatization of the management of urban water services must be accompanied by mecha-
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nisms that promote more intense competition in the industry, both in relation to public ten-
ders and also to the level of market concentration once the service is awarded. Secondly, it 
seems advisable to create independent bodies to control the behavior of water utilities and, 
in particular, their pricing policies and the way prices are reviewed. Benchmarking or com-
paring the productive activity of companies might also be a useful tool to regulate the pro-
cess of establishing water prices. 
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 Table 1. Market shares of private contracts for water supply in 
Andalusia and concentration indices. Year 2009 
 Municipalities Population 
Share of the market (%)   
Aqualia 30.3 41.8 
Aquagest 26.6 36.7 
Acciona 23.8 9.0 
Agua y Gestión 7.3 5.5 
Gestagua 6.7 5.4 
Hidrogestión 2.2 0.8 
Urbaser 1.6 0.4 
Añil 1.1 0.1 
Concentration indices   
CR1 (%) 30.3 41.8 
CR2 (%) 56.9 78.5 
HHI 0.23 0.32 
Source: own elaboration with data from Andalusian municipalities and utilities. 
Table 2. Sample description: water prices of private water utilities 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Maximum Minimum 
Fixed quota (€ per month) 2.18 0.72 5.38 0.65 
Price per m3 for a consumption of (€):     
5 m3 0.34 0.12 0.76 0.05 
10 m3 0.41 0.14 0.78 0.05 
15 m3 0.52 0.18 0.86 0.11 
20 m3 0.64 0.24 1.20 0.15 
25 m3 0.75 0.29 1.53 0.18 
50 m3 1.07 0.45 2.24 0.41 
Price of a bill with a consumption of (€, including 
fixed quota and water consumed):     
10 m3 6.31 1.77 11.24 1.88 
15 m3 9.96 2.94 16.12 2.90 
20 m3 15.01 5.12 26.71 4.40 
Source: own elaboration with data from the Official Gazettes of Andalusian provinces. 
 Table 3. Sample description: explanatory variables a 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Maximum Minimum 
VARIABLES IN THE PRICE EQUATION (162 observations)     
Population (thousands) 18.7 32.1 234.3 0.3 
Density of population (thousands inhabitants per km2) 0.424 0.920 6.940 0.005 
Strong water treatment (dummy) 0.648 - - - 
Consortium (dummy) 0.556 - - - 
Private management (dummy) 0.475 - - - 
Dummy for Aqualia 0.278 - - - 
Dummy for Aquagest 0.333 - - - 
Dummy for Acciona 0.222 - - - 
Dummy for Agua y Gestión 0.074 - - - 
Dummy for Gestagua 0.062 - - - 
Variables representing market concentration     
Market concentration (CR1) 0.602 0.165 1 0.253 
Market concentration (CR2) 0.811 0.103 1 0.491 
Market concentration (HHI) 0.428 0.183 1 0.190 
Market share of the supplying firm 0.425 0.264 1 0.001 
Years since privatization 10.3 5.6 24 1 
VARIABLES IN THE PRIVATIZATION EQUATION (715 observations)     
Population (thousands) 7.5 25.0 503.3 0.1 
Financial burden 3.701 2.801 25.59 0.001 
Income per capita (€ per inhabitant) 2,298 921 8,100 369 
Public employment (percentage) 9.2 5.5 42.6 0.0 
Neighboring effect (percentage) 21.4 13.7 52.2 0.0 
Consortium (dummy) 0.343 - - - 
Water capture system (dummy) 0.706 - - - 
Ideology (dummy) 0.186 - - - 
Mediterranean river basin (dummy) 0.337 - - - 
a For dummy variables only the means are provided, which represent the percentage of positive outcomes. 
 Table 4.  Determinants of the price of water in private utilities 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PRICE EQUATION     
Constant 5.263*** 3.157 5.754*** 6.092*** 
Population 0.020** 0.018** 0.018** 0.021** 
Density of population -0.528** -0.524** -0.511** -0.535** 
Strong water treatment 1.209*** 1.215*** 1.068** 1.248*** 
Consortium -2.938*** -2.997*** -2.726*** -2.267*** 
Private management -2.755*** -2.725*** -2.727*** -2.044*** 
Dummy for firm 1 0.238 0.242 0.003 -0.673 
Dummy for firm 2 1.950* 1.970* 1.825* 0.957 
Dummy for firm 3 0.059 0.069 -0.059 0.437 
Dummy for firm 4 3.532*** 3.063** 3.095** 2.507** 
Dummy for firm 5 0.767 0.850 0.695 1.313 
Variables representing market concentration     
Market concentration (CR1) 2.800** - - - 
Market concentration (CR2) - 4.329** - - 
Market concentration (HHI) - - 3.056*** - 
Market share of the supplying firm - - - 2.535** 
Years since privatization 0.338** 0.428** 0.385** 0.279* 
Years since privatization-squared -0.015** -0.019** -0.017** -0.012* 
PRIVATIZATION EQUATION     
Constant -2.491*** -2.493*** -2.453*** -2.486*** 
Population 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
Population-squared -1.4e-7*** -1.4e-7*** -1.4e-7*** -1.4e-7*** 
Financial burden -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 
Income per capita 4.2e-4*** 4.2e-4*** 4.2e-4*** 4.1e-4*** 
Public employment -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.048*** 
Neighboring effect 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
Consortium 0.639*** 0.637*** 0.635*** 0.621*** 
Water capture system 0.164 0.161 0.168 0.160 
Ideology 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.023 
Mediterranean river basin 0.196 0.195 0.181 0.160 
Rho 0.765 0.759 0.741 0.761 
LR test of rho=0 (Chi-squared) 25.91*** 24.92*** 20.95*** 23.77*** 
Log likelihood -647.2 -647.3 -645.5 -647.0 
Wald Chi-squared 93.77*** 93.49*** 99.25*** 92.60*** 
Number of observations 715 
Observations in the price equation 162 
a * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 Appendix 1. Variables: description and sources 
Variable Description Source 
VARIABLES IN THE PRICE EQUATION 
Price Price for a bill with average consumption of 15 m
3, including 
fixed quota 
Official Gazettes 
of the Andalusia 
provinces 
Population Population in 2009, in 1,000s of inhabitants Municipal Census. 
National Institute 
of Statistics 
Density of 
population Number of inhabitants per kilometer-squared in 2009 
Strong water 
treatment 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if water needs strong 
treatment (type A2 or A3 chemical treatment) in order to make 
it suitable for human consumption, and 0 otherwise 
Ministry of Health 
and Social Policy 
Consortium 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if in 2009 the 
supplying firm belongs to a consortium that provides water 
services to several neighboring municipalities, and 0 otherwise 
Water utilities 
Private 
management 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for private firms 
(contractual PPPs) and 0 for mixed firms (institutionalized 
PPPs). The data refer to 2009 
Dummies for 
Aqualia, Acciona, 
Aquagest, Agua y 
Gestión and 
Gestagua 
Dummies that take a value of 1 if the observation belongs to 
one of these five water utilities, and 0 otherwise 
Explanatory variables representing market concentration 
Market 
concentration 
(CR1) 
Percentage of market share held by the largest firm in the year 
of privatization, calculated on the basis of the population 
supplied in the provincial market 
Own elaboration 
Market 
concentration 
(CR2) 
Percentage of market share held by the two largest firms in the 
year of privatization, calculated on the basis of the population 
supplied in the provincial market 
Market 
concentration 
(HHI) 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index defined as the sum of the squares 
of the market shares of all supplying firms, calculated on the 
basis of the population supplied in the provincial market in the 
year of privatization 
Market share of 
the supplying firm 
Market share held by the supplying firm in year 2009. This 
share is calculated on the basis of the population supplied in 
the provincial market. 
Years since 
privatization Years elapsed from the year of privatization to 2009 Town Councils 
 Appendix 1 (continued) 
Variable Description Source 
VARIABLES IN THE PRIVATIZATION EQUATION 
Privatization 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Council has 
privatized the management of urban water services at the 
end of the period 1986-2009 and 0 if the service has not 
been privatized 
Town councils and 
firms 
Population 
Population in 1,000s of inhabitants. If the municipality 
privatizes, it takes the value from the year prior to privat-
izing. In the case of not privatizing, it takes the average 
value over the period 1986-2009 
National Institute of 
Statistics 
Financial burden 
Sum of financial expenditures over sum of ordinary 
revenues of the local government. In the case of 
privatizing, this variable takes the value of the year before 
the decision was taken. In the case of not privatizing, it 
takes the mean over the period 1986-2009 
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs  
Income per capita 
Euros per inhabitant. If the municipality privatizes, it 
takes the value from the year before privatizing. In the 
case of not privatizing, it takes the average value over the 
period 1986-2009 
Andalusia 
Government 
Public 
employment 
Percentage of public employment over total employment 
in the municipality. The data refer to year 2001 
Neighboring effect 
Percentage of municipalities that have privatized within 
the province the municipality belongs to. In the case of 
privatization, it takes the value from the year before the 
decision was made. In the case of no privatization, it 
takes the average value over the period 
City and town 
councils and private 
firms 
Consortium 
In the case of privatizing, this dummy variable takes a 
value of 1 if the council belonged to a consortium the 
previous year and 0 otherwise. In the case of not 
privatizing, it takes a value of 1 if the municipality 
belongs to a consortium in the middle of the period 1986-
2009 and 0 if not 
Ministry of Regional 
Policy 
Water capture 
system 
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if water is captured 
using mechanical means and 0 if it is captured using the 
force of gravity 
Ideology 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if PP (right-wing party) 
was in power in the local government when the decision 
of privatizing was taken, and if the municipality did not 
privatize and PP was in power at the end of the period. 
Conversely, it takes a value of 0 if PSOE, IU or PA (left-
wing parties) were in power when the decision of privat-
izing was taken, and if the municipality did not privatize 
and PSOE, IU or PA were in power at the end of the pe-
riod 1986-2009 
Home Office and 
Ministry of Regional 
Policy 
Mediterranean 
river basin 
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the municipality 
belongs to the Mediterranean river basin and 0 otherwise 
Annual Report of 
the Southern 
Hydrographic 
Federation 
 Appendix 2. Determinants of the price of water in private utilities considering different alternatives to measure prices 
 Price of a bill with consumption of 10 m3 Price of a bill with consumption of 20 m3 
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PRICE EQUATION         
Variables representing market concentration         
Market concentration (CR1) 1.493* - - - 4.365** - - - 
Market concentration (CR2) - 2.714** - - - 5.662 - - 
Market concentration (HHI) - - 1.535** - - - 4.555** - 
Market share of the supplying firm - - - 0.357 - - - 4.652** 
Years since privatization 0.201** 0.266** 0.221** 0.163 0.570** 0.667** 0.638** 0.500* 
Years since privatization-squared -0.009** -0.011** -0.009** -0.007* -0.025** -0.029** -0.028** -0.022* 
Rho 0.789 0.785 0.758 0.790 0.788 0.782 0.772 0.804 
LR test of rho=0 (Chi-squared) 23.39*** 22.47*** 18.55*** 22.90*** 26.52** 25.43*** 21.94*** 24.74*** 
Log likelihood -564.8 -564.2 -563.8 -566.4 -728.3 -729.0 -727.1 -727.3 
Wald Chi-squared 84.76*** 86.47*** 87.34*** 79.09*** 128.73*** 126.05*** 133.43*** 131.78*** 
a * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
